In our news
item of last week, “What Every Christian Should Know about Islamic Jihad”, we
attempted to enlighten our readers to the implications of a world-wide Islamic
revolution that has been materializing over the last three to four decades. In
the article we surmised that the driving force behind this religious revival
was the great spiritual challenge between Sunni and Shiite national leaders for
political domination of the faith via a return of the Islamic caliphate.
Central to the dispute was the rival claims of high protector of the faith by
Shia Iran and the Sunni regime in Saudi Arabia. We are now seeing the
manifestation of that dispute being played out with regularity by the daily
military and political developments in the Syrian civil war.
Make no
mistake about it; the violent fight for political control over Syria has much
more at stake than the simple overthrow of the despotic, Bashar al-Assad regime
in Damascus. It is also looking more and more likely that the conclusion to
this tragic affair will ultimately be decided by participants not already
engaged in the vicious fighting inside of Syria’s borders. That’s because the
international stakes for control over Syria far outweigh the domestic
implications of a change of regime in the Syrian capital. The balance of power
equation in both the Arabic and Islamic worlds, as well as the strategic
ascendency in the Mideast are all now very much in play by the increasing
interventions of ulterior parties to the Syrian conflict.
What started
out more than two years ago ostensibly as an extension of the Arab Spring
revolution has very quickly deteriorated in the last five to six months as a distinctly
regional affair with pointedly global implications? More importantly, these
implications can no longer be contained within the framework of a purely
political settlement between the opposing domestic factions involved in the
dispute, since it is virtually impossible to equate one of the fighting parties
as representative of a majority of the Syrian people. With the influx of
foreign interest groups rushing to intervene in the Syrian affair, the civil
war has quickly devolved into a bitter and confusing quagmire with devoutly spiritual
and political overtones wafting far beyond the Syrian frontier.
The Combatants and their Patrons
Bashar
al-Assad is the incumbent leader of the Baathist regime in Damascus. He has run
the country for more than a dozen years after taking over from his father,
Hafez al-Assad in 2000. Before his death the elder Assad held nearly
dictatorial powers over Syria for thirty years. In that interval, Hafez
al-Assad attracted strong popular support for his reign by surging to the
forefront of the Arab world’s staunch opposition to the Jewish state of Israel
and then he vigorously directed his minority-led, Alawite regime firmly into
the Soviet camp for the duration of the Cold War. The Alawites are a mystical
offshoot of the Shia sect of Islam and suffered through generations of Syrian
government persecution from the majority Sunni regimes that held sway over the
nation before the Baathists took power in 1963.
Hafez
al-Assad was one of the key Arab leaders who embraced Ayatollah Khomeini’s
Islamic Revolution in Iran and then teamed up with his Shia Iranian allies in
fomenting religious unrest in the neighboring state of Lebanon, while that
nation was in the grips of its own sectarian, civil war. When Israel invaded
Lebanon in 1982, Syria took on a more direct approach in intervening in
Lebanese affairs by secretly aiding and arming Lebanese Moslem militias
fighting the Israelis’ and their Lebanese Christian allies. The Syrian military
began infiltrating regular army units into Eastern Lebanon in the 1980’s in
order to check the advance of the Israelis’ and to safeguard their military
supply lines to the Hezbollah militia, from strongpoints in the Bekaa Valley. From
this point on, the Syrians have cultivated strong religious, political and
military bonds with their Hezbollah allies and their chief financial patrons in
Teheran.
On the other
end of the ideological spectrum is the majority Sunni opposition to the
Baathist regime in Damascus. The Sunni opposition groups began to foment open
rebellion against the Assad regime as a direct consequence of the Arab Spring
revolt that was then materializing in Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt.
But the Sunni majority in Syria was ideologically splintered along tribal
lines and over their embrace of armed rebellion to promote regime change in
Damascus. When the opposition Free Syrian Army was formed in July of 2011, it
openly declared a non-sectarian enrollment and pledged that its only goal was
the unconditional removal of the Assad regime from power. Under these
principles the Free Syrian Army took volunteers from all walks of Syrian life
including: disgruntled Alawites; minority Kurds, Turkmen and Druze, as well as
defectors from the Syrian Armed Forces.
In addition
to the non-sectarian, political resistance, the fervent, Sunni fundamentalist
groups began to gravitate toward the radical Jabhat al-Nusra militia, or
al-Nusra Front, as it is popularly known. Jabhat al-Nusra is a radical, Salafi
jihadist group that infiltrated across the Syrian border from Iraq, where it
once was engaged in battle against US troops as part of the Islamic State of
Iraq, militant faction. This group has or had close ties to Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; two of the most radical, anti-western
terrorist leaders in the world and close affiliates of the Al Qaeda
organization. The al-Nusra front ostensibly committed itself to battle in Syria
not as much to instigate the downfall of the Assad regime but to rid the Syrian
government of its Shia domination and to replace the minority Alawite regime
with a fundamentalist, Salafist government based on Sharia Law.
At first,
the Free Syrian Army enjoyed adequate financial support from many of the rich,
Persian Gulf Arab states but soon saw that aid cut in half when the Salafist
donations from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey were redirected to the Islamic
al-Nusra Front. The more experienced Salafi fighters soon began to take on a
more prominent role in the Civil War because of their more effective resistance
to Assad’s forces. Over the last year the FSA and their al-Nusra allies were
able to secure wide swaths of the Syrian countryside and in the northern cities
of Homs and Aleppo. But recently Assad’s forces have regained the initiative on
the battlefield because of extensive foreign aid filtering in from Iran and
Russia, as well as direct military intervention from the Lebanese Hezbollah.
International Escalation
In the last
several months the western world has faced a dilemma in intervening in the
Syrian Civil War. Although the USA and her NATO allies energetically moved to
politically unify the various, Syrian factions under the umbrella of an
internationally recognized, political opposition group, the Syrian National
Council and later Syrian National Coalition; they have still not wholeheartedly committed themselves to actively
arming the Syrian resistance armies. Part of the reason for this is their
suspicions that military assistance will eventually find its way into the
coffers of the jihadist, al-Nusra front and somehow be used against them in the
form of international terrorism; a prospect that can never be ruled out
considering al-Nusra’s fundamental ties to Al Qaeda and the Salafi jihadist
movement. In the interim, the west risks the likelihood that their continued
intransigence in arming the more moderate rebels will effectively marginalize
the Free Syrian Army to the point where al-Nusra will be cast into the leading
role as Assad’s main opposition.
![]() |
| bombed out Syrian Army vehicles in Aleppo |
In the
meantime, other forces are already in motion that can only discernably spell a
more lengthy and violent struggle for the Syrian people. It is now quite
obvious because of the active participation of Hezbollah soldiers fighting
alongside Assad’s forces that Iran has committed itself to taking on a far more
prominent role in the arbitrating of political power in the Mideast. In all
probability, the Iranians see the preservation of a strongly allied regime in
Damascus as being a necessary precondition for their increasingly
confrontational stance against Israel. Teheran also needs a friendly regime in
Damascus to insulate their political operations in Lebanon, Iraq and the
Palestinian territories. Those four entities are paramount to the sustaining of
Iranian spiritual influence in the Islamic heartland by establishing a formidable
barrier to the proliferation of Sunni Salafist doctrine in the diversified
enclaves of the Arab Levant.
Central to
Iran’s struggle for political dominance over the Islamic revival is their
aggressive posturing toward the state of Israel. So far it has been able to
distance itself from direct confrontation with her Jewish nemesis by
maintaining a subversive influence over its client armies and paramilitary
insurgent groups. These groups keep a majority of Israel’s military
establishment preoccupied with defending their frontier against cross-border
missile strikes and other pseudo-terrorist, hostile activity. Thus Teheran is
able to keep the flames of hostility to the Jewish state burning brightly and
by the same token, is able to portray itself as the great protector of the
Islamic faith by requisitioning its Arab clients to do their dirty work while never
having to sacrifice its ruefully, untested military forces in a direct
confrontation with the IDF.
One of the
dangers of this new Iranian posturing is that it could be meant to drag Israel
into a draining and untimely, regional conflict in either Lebanon or the Golan
Heights, in order to expedite its nuclear enrichment process, free from the
threat of Israeli intervention. Time is about to reach the critical phase in
Iran’s covert development of a nuclear weapon and the Israeli’s have made no
bones about their commitment to deter the Iranian scientists from bringing
their plans to fruition. Consequently, Iran has a crucial incentive to defer
Israeli preparations by diverting their military attention away from the
Iranian nuclear research facilities at Isfahan, Natanz, Arak, Parchin, Fordu
and Chalus. All these facilities are crucial to Iran’s development of nuclear
weapons thus could all be potential targets in an Israeli preemptive strike.
We are
already beginning to see the initial stages of a possible protracted effort by
the regime of Bashar al-Assad to distract the Islamic resistance away from the
inter-religious, fratricidal fighting in Syria onto more celebrated Israeli
targets on the Golan Heights. Recently Assad went on record in stating his
desire to give the Free Syrian Army a free hand in executing offensive
operations on the strategic Golan to check the encroachment of Israeli
reconnaissance teams maneuvering on the disputed heights. Israel is also
closely monitoring military movement in the disputed border regions of Southern
Lebanon, always a hotbed of Hezbollah activity and an area that has attracted particular
Israeli scrutiny for its operating of Hezbollah drone vehicles. All these
flashpoints are ripe for Iranian exploitation as long as tempers remain so volatile.
Another
puzzling development in the Syrian Civil War and one that has certain selfish,
political connotations is the reemergence of Russia in a familiar, provocative
role as a potential spoiler against American and Israeli interests. The Kremlin’s
recent decision to supply the Assad regime with highly advanced, S-300
anti-aircraft missile batteries can only be construed as an aggressive affront
to Israeli and/or western-based air forces, which might be harboring plans to
implement a no-fly zone over Syrian airspace to neutralize the advantage of
Assad’s air power over the rebel armies. Since the rebels have no air power to
speak of, the delivery of such an advanced weapons system to the Assad regime
must solely be meant to forestall the enactment of a distinctly western formulated
peace plan for the region and one that would preclude the presence of NATO
aircraft flying out of Turkey or the Mediterranean, in order to police a
potential UN-sanctioned settlement.
Yet it
should come as no surprise to the west that Russia has a vested, financial
interest in Iran’s nuclear development program. They also remain firmly devoted
to their former Cold War client regime in Damascus, which has also been
enriched by the profitable contribution of Soviet and now Russian, arms
technology. Thus the Kremlin has no desire to see Bashar al-Assad be overthrown
by a group of Salafist agitators, especially with its own restless, Moslem
populations clamoring for a more inclusive role in the worldwide Islamic
revival. The same could also be said of Moscow’s reluctance to approve a western-sanctioned
plan that obliges Assad to voluntarily relinquish control over the Damascus
government. In that scenario, Moscow will never commit itself to kowtowing to
the interests of its historic enemies in Turkey and Israel, unless of course
the west is prepared to kowtow to the Kremlin’s interests.
Repercussions for the West
So while
Assad sustains his grip on power through the valuable assistance of his generous
patrons in Teheran, Moscow, Beirut and Baghdad; the Syrian resistance is
beginning to show the signs of a potentially fatal, ideological rift along
political and spiritual lines. While a vacillating western world contemplates
jumping headlong into the fray by throwing all of their military weight behind
the secular Syrian National Coalition; its military arm, the Free Syrian Army, is
slowly losing popular sentiment to its more fearsome but controversial sidekick,
the Salafi, al-Nusra Front. The fate of the Syrian National Coalition is now in
the hands of Washington and her reluctant allies in London, Paris and Berlin.
Should they commit themselves to providing their secular clients with the
necessary weapons of war to turn the tables in the Syrian Civil War than it is
quite plausible that the whole dynamics of Mideast politics might suddenly take
on the benevolent manifestation of the Arab Spring after all?
Plausible
but not probable! More than likely the western world’s reluctance to fully
commit to the arming of the Free Syrian Army has already cost the rebels immense
political credibility in the eyes of the Syrian public. We are beginning to see
the causative effects of that damage in the increasing numbers of disillusioned
refugees that have bolted across the border into Turkey and Jordan and in some
cases, Lebanon or Iraq. Many of these émigrés’ have lost faith in the Free
Syrian Army’s ability to bring about the desired regime change that once seemed
so promising and within their grasp. Many of them fear the rigid theocracy promised
by the Salafist rebels even more than the despotic Baathist regime still in
control. Millions of Syrians have yielded to the inevitability that their
ultimate fate now rests in the hands of discretely foreign, political and
spiritual interests.
Even if the
west commits itself to arming the Free Syrian Army, the military future of the
Syrian resistance looks bleak at best. One can even see a general breakdown of
the movement on roughly sectarian lines, just as it did in Iraq less than a
decade earlier. In all likelihood, al-Nusra and the Salafi jihadists are in
Syria to stay. The main difference from the debacle in Iraq is that the
Salafist groups were vastly outnumbered by the predominantly Shia, Iraqi
population. Thus the Americans were able to effectively isolate the jihadist
groups and bring their overwhelming firepower to bear in the Salafi stronghold
of Anbar Province. This won’t be the case in Syria, where the Sunni Salafists
enjoy a large majority and will be able to exploit their spiritual differences
with the dreaded Alawite oppressors much more prevalently than they could in
Iraq.
Under these
circumstances and intrinsic in the deftly humanitarian ethos ingrained in the
western world, it is quite probable that the west will feel the need to push
for a distinctly political settlement to the Syrian Civil War, especially after
it quickly realizes the futility of banking on a military decision to conclude
the conflict. But as honorable and humane as that might sound, the prospects of
any long-term success, politically-speaking, are negligible. That’s because the
doctrinal showdown between Sunni and Shia are already locked in mortal combat
and these forces far outweigh the preponderance of any western-brokered,
political settlement. It is because of this that the Syrian Civil War has now
reached the critical point of no return, where the clearly political solutions
have yielded to the inviolability of purely spiritual momentum.
In the
course of this long expected conflict, you will see the Iranians contemptuously
provoke their Israeli archenemies, in a shameless attempt to curry favor from
the Arabic world. We will see the Salafi jihadists bring their disgraceful
suicide bombings into the secular enclaves of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, as
they race to exact their abominable religious creed on the people with the
least tolerance for it. And sadly, we will watch the west once again be drawn
into an ever-widening conflict with an indigenous population that will never
reconcile with the apostasy of an alien faith. Today the Syrian Civil War is a
tragic, national affair that is threatening to bring down a regime that has far
outlived its utility and worth. But tomorrow or next month or next year, the
Syrian Civil War will begin to spill far beyond its ancient borders and the
whole world will quickly forget that the Syrians were once the only victims of
this calamity.
The Syrian
civil war can no longer be looked at as a distinctly Syrian affair; not with
the influx of foreign antagonists purged to force their will upon the
unsuspecting citizens that have built and shaped that ancient, cultured
society. Today there are Lebanese Hezbollah and other Shia groups from across
the Levant storming into the country to assist the Baathist Assad regime.
Radical, Salafi jihadists, fresh from their despicable performance in fomenting
the secular violence that engulfed post-Saddam Iraq, keep surging across the
Syrian-Iraq border looking to end the minority-led Shia regime in Damascus.
Iranian agents and their Saudi and Gulf Arab counterparts have fanned out
across the country, fueling the deep hatreds that drive the conflict. Soon
there will be other nationalities and religious sects that will be drawn into
the great spiritual and political feuds that have infested Syria’s soul. They
too will snatch a piece of the Syrian corpse in the name of Islam or some
wayward political creed that has virtually no bearing on the plight of the
Syrian people. But they won’t stop the hemorrhaging and they won’t stop the
death.
.jpg)




















